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$B:4F#!wEl5~M}2JBg3X$G$9!#(B

sandbox $B$N@bL@$O(B $B$P$7$P$70ULu$7$F$7$^$C$?$N$G!"(B
$B4*0c$$$7$F$$$k$H$3$m$,$"$l$P;XE&$7$F2<$5$$!#(B

>         # ./MAKEDEV sd1s5

s/sd/da/ $B$NJQ49K:$l$,86J8$K;D$C$F$$$k$_$?$$$G$9!#(B

 # $B$"$H!"8D?ME*$K$O(B s/hack/crack/ $B$K$7$FM_$7$$$G$9!#(B

ja_JP.eucJP/FAQ/admin $B$N(B 1.22 $B$+$i$N(B diff $B$K$7$^$7$?$N$G!"(B
$B$=$l$b0l=o$KE:IU$7$^$9!#(B

> @@ -66,22 +66,19 @@
>      <sect1>
>        <heading>How do I add a user easily?</heading>
>  
> -      <p>Use the <htmlurl url="http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?adduser"
> -      name="adduser"> command.
> +      <p>Use the <htmlurl url="http://www.FreeBSD.org/cgi/man.cgi?adduser"
> +      name="adduser"> command. For more complicated usage, the
> +      <htmlurl url="http://www.FreeBSD.org/cgi/man.cgi?pw" name="pw"> command.

      <p>Use the <htmlurl url="http://www.FreeBSD.org/cgi/man.cgi?adduser"
      name="adduser"> command. $B$^$?(B,
      <htmlurl url="http://www.FreeBSD.org/cgi/man.cgi?pw" name="pw">
      $B%3%^%s%I$rMQ$$$k$3$H$G(B, $B$5$i$K:Y$+$$A`:n$,2DG=$G$9(B.

>     <sect1>
> +     <heading>I can't create the snd0 device!</heading>
> +
> +     <p>The command to create the devices for the sound card is:
> +<verb>
> +     # cd /dev
> +     # sh MAKEDEV snd0
> +</verb>
> +
> +     <p>However, this does not make a device named <tt>/dev/snd0</tt>.
> +     Instead, it creates devices named <tt>mixer0</tt>, <tt>sndstat0</tt>,
> +     <tt>dsp0</tt>, and others.  Running the command is still necessary
> +     to add sound devices, however.
> +

   <sect1>
     <heading>snd0 $B%G%P%$%9$r:n@.$9$k$3$H$,$G$-$^$;$s(B!</heading>

     <p>$B0J2<$K<($9%3%^%s%I$G%5%&%s%I%+!<%IMQ$N%G%P%$%9$r:n$k$3$H$,$G$-$^$9(B.
<verb>
     # cd /dev
     # sh MAKEDEV snd0
</verb>

     <p>$B$?$@$7(B, $B$3$N%3%^%s%I$O(B <tt>/dev/snd0</tt>
        $B$H$$$&L>A0$N%G%P%$%9%U%!%$%k$r:n@.$9$k$o$1$G$O$J$/(B, $BBe$o$j$K(B
        <tt>mixer0</tt> $B$d(B <tt>sndstat0</tt>, <tt>dsp0</tt>
        $B$J$I$H$$$C$?L>A0$N%G%P%$%9%U%!%$%k$r:n@.$7$^$9(B.
        $B:n@.$5$l$k%G%P%$%9L>$O0[$J$k$N$G$9$,(B,
        $B%5%&%s%I%G%P%$%9$rDI2C$9$k$?$a$K$O(B, $B0MA3$H$7$F(B
        $B>e$K<($9%3%^%s%I$N<B9T$,I,MW$G$9(B.

> +    <sect1>
> +      <heading>What is a sandbox?</heading>
> +
> +      <p>&quot;Sandbox&quot; is a security term.  It can mean two things:

    <sect1>
      <heading>$B:=H"(B(sandbox)$B$H$O2?$G$9$+(B?</heading>

      <p>&quot;$B:=H"(B(Sandbox)&quot; $B$H$O%;%-%e%j%F%#MQ8l$N0l$D$G(B,
        $B<!$NFs$D$N0UL#$,$"$j$^$9(B.

> +      <itemize>
> +       <item>
> +         <p>A process which is placed inside a set of virtual walls
> +           that are designed to prevent someone who breaks into the
> +           process from being able to break into the wider system.
> +
> +         <p>The process is said to be able to "play" inside the
> +           walls.  That is, nothing the process does in regards to
> +           executing code is supposed to be able to breech the walls
> +           so you do not have to do a detailed audit of its code to
> +           be able to say certain things about its security.
> +
> +         <p>The walls might be a userid, for example.  This is the
> +           definition used in the security and named man pages.
> +
> +         <p>Take the 'ntalk' service, for example (see
> +           /etc/inetd.conf).  This service used to run as userid
> +           root.  Now it runs as userid tty.  The tty user is a
> +           sandbox designed to make it more difficult for someone
> +           who has successfully hacked into the system via ntalk from
> +           being able to hack beyond that user id.
> +       </item>

      <itemize>
       <item>
         <p>$B<B<AE*$K!XKIJI!Y$rHw$($F$$$k%W%m%;%9$N$3$H$G$9(B.
        $B$=$N!XKIJI!Y$O(B, $B$=$N%W%m%;%9$K?/F~$7$?Bh;0<T$,(B,
        $B$5$i$K%7%9%F%`$N9-$$HO0O$K1F6A$rM?$($k$3$H$rKI$0$h$&$K@_7W$5$l$F$$$^$9(B.
 
        <p>$B$3$N%W%m%;%9$N?6Iq$$$O(B, $B!XKIJI!Y$NCf$@$1$K@)8B$5$l$k(B, $B$HI=8=$G$-$^$9(B.
        $B$D$^$j(B, $B$3$N%W%m%;%9$K$*$$$F(B, $B!XKIJI!Y$r1[$($k$h$&$J%3!<%I$N<B9T$O(B
        $B$G$-$J$$$H$$$&0UL#$G$9(B. $B$=$N$?$a(B, $B%3!<%I$N<B9T$K$*$1$k%;%-%e%j%F%#$O(B
        $B3N$+$J$b$N$G$"$k$HJ]>Z$G$-(B, $B<B9T$N>\:Y$JDI@W$r9T$J$&I,MW$O$J$/$J$j$^$9(B.

         <p>$B$=$N!XKIJI!Y$H$O(B, $BNc$($P%f!<%6(B ID $B$,$=$l$K$"$?$k$G$7$g$&(B.
        $B$3$NDj5A$O(B, $B%;%-%e%j%F%#$d(B named $B$N%^%K%e%"%k%Z!<%8$GMQ$$$i$l$F$$$^$9(B.
        
         <p>'ntaik' $B%5!<%S%9(B(/etc/inetd.conf $B;2>H$N$3$H(B)$B$rNc$K$H$C$F$_$^$9(B.
        $B$3$N%5!<%S%9$O$+$D$F(B, $B<B9T;~$N(B $B%f!<%6(B ID $B$H$7$F(B
        root $B$rMQ$$$F$$$^$7$?$,(B, $B8=:_$G$O(B tty $B$H$$$&%f!<%6(B ID $B$GF0:n$7$^$9(B.
        $B%f!<%6(B tty $B$O(B, ntalk $B$r7PM3$7$F%7%9%F%`$N?/F~$K@.8y$7$?Bh;0<T$,(B
        $B$=$N%f!<%6(B ID $B0J>e$N8"8B$rF@$k$3$H$r(B,
        $B$h$j0lAX:$Fq$K$9$k$?$a$K@_7W$5$l$?:=H"(B(sandbox)$B$J$N$G$9(B. 
       </item>
 

> +       <item>
> +         <p>A process which is placed inside a simulation of the
> +           machine.  This is more hard-core.  Basically it means that
> +           someone who is able to break into the process may believe
> +           that he can break into the wider machine but is, in fact,
> +           only breaking into a simulation of that machine and not
> +           modifying any real data.

            <p>$B%7%_%e%l!<%H$5$l$?%^%7%s$NFbB&$G<B9T$5$l$k%W%m%;%9$N$3$H$G(B,
              $B$3$l$O$h$jCf3KE*$G$9(B.
              $BIaDL$K9M$($l$P(B, $B$"$k%W%m%;%9$K?/F~$9$k$3$H$,$G$-$kBh;0<T$O(B,
              $B%^%7%s$N$h$j9-$$HO0O$K$b?/F~$G$-$k$H?.$8$k$b$N$G$9(B.
              $B$7$+$7(B, $B<B:]$K$O%7%_%e%l!<%H$5$l$?%^%7%s$K?/F~$7$?$@$1$G(B,
              $B8=<B$N%G!<%?$rJQ99$9$k$3$H$OA4$/$G$-$J$$$N$G$9(B.

> +
> +         <p>The most common way to accomplish this is to build a
> +           simulated environment in a subdirectory and then run the
> +           processes in that directory chroot'd (i.e. "/" for that
> +           process is this directory, not the real "/" of the
> +           system).

            <p>$B$3$l$r<B8=$9$k$?$a$N:G$b9-$/MQ$$$i$l$F$$$kJ}K!$O(B,
             $B%7%_%e%l!<%H$5$l$?4D6-$r%5%V%G%#%l%/%H%j$K9=C[$7(B,
             $B$=$N%G%#%l%/%H%j$K(B chroot $B$7$F(B, $B$=$N%G%#%l%/%H%j$G(B
             $B%W%m%;%9$r<B9T$9$k$3$H(B($B$D$^$j(B, $B$=$N%W%m%;%9$K$H$C$F(B "/" $B$O(B
             $B%7%9%F%`$N<B:]$N%k!<%H%G%#%l%/%H%j(B "/" $B$G$O$J$/(B,
             chroot $B$5$l$?%5%V%G%#%l%/%H%j$r;X$9(B)$B$G$9(B.

> +
> +         <p>Another common use is to mount an underlying filesystem
> +           read-only and then create a filesystem layer on top of it
> +           that gives a process a seemingly writeable view into that
> +           filesystem.  The process may believe it is able to write
> +           to those files, but only the process sees the effects
> +           &dash; other processes in the system do not, necessarily.
> +           <p>An attempt is made to make this sort of sandbox so
> +           transparent that the user (or hacker) does not realize
> +           that he is sitting in it.

            <p>$B9-$/MQ$$$i$l$F$$$k$b$&0l$D$NJ}K!$,$"$j$^$9(B.
             $B$=$l$O(B, $B4{$KB8:_$7$F$$$k%U%!%$%k%7%9%F%`$r(B
             $BFI$_9~$_@lMQ(B(read-only)$B$G%^%&%s%H$7(B, $B$=$N>e$K(B, $B%W%m%;%9$KBP$7$F(B
             $B$"$?$+$b$=$N%U%!%$%k%7%9%F%`$,=q$-9~$_2DG=$G$"$k$H8+$;$+$1$k$h$&$J(B,
             $B$b$&0l$D$N%U%!%$%k%7%9%F%`$NAX$rMQ0U$9$k$b$N$G$9(B.
             $B%W%m%;%9$O%U%!%$%k$r=q$-9~$`$3$H$,$G$-$k$HG'<1$7$F$$$^$9$,(B, 
             $B$$$6$=$&$7$h$&$H$7$?;~(B, $BI,MW$K1~$8$F$3$N:nMQ(B &dash;
             $B%7%9%F%`$NB>$N%W%m%;%9$K$J$$$h$&$J(B, $B$,8=$l$^$9(B.

            <p>$B$3$N<o$N:=H"(B(sandbox)$B$O(B,
             $B$=$NHs>o$KF)2aE*$J@-<A$r;H$C$F(B, $B%f!<%6(B($B$b$7$/$O?/F~<T(B)$B$,(B
             $B$=$N;v<B$K5$IU$+$J$$$h$&$K<B8=$5$l$^$9(B.

> +       </item>
> +      </itemize>
> +
> +      <p>UNIX implements two core sanboxes.  One is at the process
> +        level, and one is at the userid level.
> +
> +      <p>Every UNIX process is completely firewalled off from every
> +        other UNIX process.  One process can not modify the address space
> +        of another.  This is unlike Windows where a process can easily
> +        overwrite the address space of any other, leading to a crash.
> +
> +      <p>A UNIX process is owned by a patricular userid.  If the
> +        userid is not the root user, it serves to firewall the process
> +        off from processes owned by other users.  The userid is also
> +        used to firewall off on-disk data.
> +
> +  </sect> 
> +

      <p>UNIX $B$O(B, $BFbItE*$KFs$D$N:=H"(B(sandbox)$B$r<BAu$7$F$$$^$9(B.
        $B0l$D$O%W%m%;%9%l%Y%k$N$b$N(B, $B$b$&0l$D$O%f!<%6(B ID $B%l%Y%k$N$b$N$G$9(B.

      <p>UNIX $B%W%m%;%9$OA4$F(B, $BB>$N(B UNIX $B%W%m%;%9$+$i40A4$K3VN%$5$l$F$$$^$9(B.
        $B$I$N%W%m%;%9$b(B, $BB>$N%W%m%;%9$N%"%I%l%96u4V$rJQ99$9$k$3$H$O$G$-$^$;$s(B.
        $B$3$l$O(B, $B$"$k%W%m%;%9$,B>$N%W%m%;%9$N%"%I%l%96u4V$r>e=q$-$G$-$k$h$&$J(B,
        $B%/%i%C%7%e$K$D$J$,$k9T0Y$,MF0W$K<B8=$G$-$k(B Windows $B$H$OA4$/0[$J$k$b$N$G$9(B.

      <p>UNIX $B%W%m%;%9$O(B, $BFCDj$N%f!<%6(B ID $B$,=jM-$7$^$9(B.
         $B$b$7(B, $B<B9T<T$N%f!<%6(B ID $B$,(B root $B%f!<%6$N$b$N$G$J$1$l$P(B,
         $B%f!<%6(B ID $B$O(B, $BB>$N%f!<%6$,=jM-$9$k%W%m%;%9$+$i(B
         $B$=$N%W%m%;%9$r<i$k5!G=$r2L$?$9$o$1$G$9(B.
         $B$^$?(B, $B$=$N%f!<%6(B ID $B$O(B, $B%G%#%9%/>e$K$"$k%G!<%?$r(B
         $BJ]8n$9$k$N$K$b;H$o$l$F$$$^$9(B.
  </sect> 


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